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exclamation rule Wigmore makes the following observation which
is extremely significant when read in light of the principal case: "To
admit hearsay testimony simply because it was uttered at the time
something else was going on is to introduce an arbitrary and un-
reasoned test, and to remove all limits of principle; and this has been
the result."
3 4
Although the spontaneous exclamation rule has in many instances
provided a reliable basis for the introduction of hearsay evidence
before the jury, the rule itself presupposes a spontaneous utterance
prompted by and related to an exciting event which stills the powers
of reflection and fabrication. When the courts use this rule as a con-
duit to introduce in evidence before the jury extrajudicial statements
which are distinct, separate, and unrelated to the occurrence which
provoked them, the reason for the rule disappears.
OWEN A. NEFF
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
AND THE CONSTITUTION
William Hoag has been a party in forma pauperis before the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, the Supreme
Court of that state and the United States Supreme Court.' Although
evoking the sympathy of six members of the enumerated courts in his
quest for freedom, Hoag's conviction has not been reversed. The facts
are as follows: Three men, including the defendant, allegedly rob-
bed five persons at gun point in a Fairview, New Jersey, bar. After
the apprehension of Hoag, three indictments were returned by the
grand jury, each charging him with the robbery of a different vic-
tim. The remaining two victims were not named in the indictments.
Alibi was the only defense interposed. Yager, one of the victims,
who was not named in any of the three original indictments, was the
only witness to give positive identification of the defendant. After
a finding of not guilty on the first three indictments, the defendant
company,' referring to premium-money alleged by the insurance company not to
have been received. Such an utterance would by the present spurious limitation
clearly be inadmissible. On principle, however, it would seem also inadmissible
under the legitimate principles of the Exception.. 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1754
(3 d ed. 194o).
"'Id. § 17570).
'State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 114 A.2d 573 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd, 21 N.J.
496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), aff'd, Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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was then indicted for the robbery of Yager. Again the defense of alibi
was offered. This time a verdict of guilty resulted.
The first issue presented in the New Jersey state courts by these
facts was that of former or double jeopardy under the New Jersey
Constitution.2 To sustain a plea on this ground the successive offenses
charged must be the same. In denying the defendant's plea of former
jeopardy, the trial court, the intermediate appellate court, and a
majority of the Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that it was not
former jeopardy to try the defendant for robbing Yager after being
formerly acquitted of robbing three other persons, even though
each robbery took place on the same occasion. The robbery of each
person was held to be a separate offense, and a separate prosecution
for each was held not to violate the double jeopardy clause of the
New Jersey Constitution.3
The constitutional issue upon which certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court in Hoag -v. New Jersey4 was whether
fundamental fairness implicit in due process was violated: (i) by the
prosecution of defendant in two actions for multiple offenset when the
offenses charged arose out of the same occurrence and could easily
have been tried in one proceeding, and (2) by the relitigation of the
fact issue of the defendant's identity as raised by his alibi defense. 5
The first due process contention is whether the successive prose-
cutions deny the defendant the fundamental procedural fairness re-
quired by fourteenth amendment due process. "As in all cases involv-
ing what is or is not due process ... no hard and fast rule can be laid
3"No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." N.J. Const. art.
I, para. xi. The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, contained
in the fifth amendmert, does not apply to the states. Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424, 426 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
3For discussions of the Hoag case on the issue as to whether the accused was
twice put in jeopardy by being tried in separate proceedings for robberies of dif-
ferent persons, committed at the same time and in the same place, see Note, 25
Fordham E. Rev. 531 (1956); Comment, 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 8o (1957).
It is generally held that a plea of double jeopardy requires that the victim of
the crime charged in each prosecution be the same person. People v. Lagomarsino,
97 Cal. App. 2d 92, 217 P.2d 124, 128 (1956); In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 Pac. 820,
822 (1889); Blitch v. Buchanan, xoo Fla. 1242, 132 So. 474, 475 (1931); State v. Taylor,
138 Kan. 407, 26 P.2d 598, 6o2 (1933); Keeton v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18
S.W. 359, 360 (1892); State v. Roberts, 17o La. 727, 129 So. 144, 145 (193o); Johns v.
State, 130 Miss. 803, 95 So. 84, 85 (1923); People v. Rogers, 102 Misc. 437, 17o N.Y.
Supp. 86, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 184 App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451, 452,
aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 882 ('919);.Orcutt v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 217, 3 P.2d 912,
915 (1931); Alsup v. State, 12o Tex. Crim. 310, 49 S.W.2d 749, 751 (1932); 1 Ander-
son, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 143 (1957).
'356 U.S. 464 (1958).
11d. at 470.
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down. The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case." 6 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing the majority
opinion in the principal case, arrived at the conclusion that funda-
mental fairness had not been abridged.7 Merely because the robberies
which the defendant is alleged to have committed could have been
tried together but instead were tried in two separate proceedings does
not "subject him to a ... hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it."s Unless it can be said that it is unfair
and oppressive to one who has committed several offenses for him
to be tried for these separate offenses in separate trials, a finding that
New Jersey has denied him due process of law would not be warranted.
The second issue reviewed by the Supreme Court is that of col-
lateral estoppel: "Where a question of fact essential to the judgment
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent
action on a different cause of action.. .."9 Hoag contended that col-
lateral estoppel should have been applied in the second trial as to
the issue of alibi and because it was not applied, due process of law
had been denied to him. The Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to
invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating that the facts on
which the defense of alibi was based were not necessarily resolved by
the first jury's general verdict of not guilty. "There is nothing to
show that the jury did not acquit the defendant on some other ground
or because of a general insufficiency in the State's proof [citations
omitted]. Obviously, the trial of the first three indictments involved
several questions, not just the defendant's identity, and there is no way
of knowing upon which question the jury's verdict turned."10
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing the majority opinion, expressed doubt
8Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427 (1953).
7356 U.S. at 468.
8Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
9Restatement, Judgments § 68(1) (1942). Subsection (2) of this section states that
"A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a subsequent action on a
different cause of action as to questions of fact not actually litigated and determined
in the first action."
"A victim of varying terminology, the concept has been applied under such aliases
as 'estoppel by record,' [United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D.N.J. 1953)]'estoppel by findings,' [Turner v. Bragg, 117 Vt. 9, 82 A.2d 511 (1951)] 'estoppel by
verdict,' [Goodman v. McLennan, 334 Il1. App. 405, 429, 8o N.E.2d 396, 4o6 (1948)]
and 'estoppel by judgment,' [Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1952)] among
others." Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev.
217 (1954). Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata,
35 11. L. Rev. 41 (19io).
10 State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, x22 A..d 628, 632 (1956).
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whether collateral estoppel could be regarded as within the ambit
of due process. However, he refused to discuss the matter on the
ground that the Supreme Court's corrective power over state court
decisions did- not extend far enough to allow a different conclusion
as to the basis for the jury's decision than that reached by the New
Jersey courts.
It appears that Justice Harlan reached the correct result in the
principal case. That is, the relitigation of the issue of alibi in New
Jersey did not deny the defendant due process of law. It is submitted,
however, that the reasoning employed in reaching this result is fal-
lacious. Quoting" with approval Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Watts v. Indiana," Justice Harlan states: " 'On review here of State
convictions, all those matters which are ,usually termed issues of fact
are for the conclusive determination of the State Courts and are not
open for reconsideration by this Court.' "12 By this passage Justice
Harlan implied that the Supreme Court. of New Jersey determined
as a question of fact that the basis of the jury's verdict was open to
conjecture. This, it is submitted, is incorrect. In order for collateral
estoppel to apply, "a question of fact essential to the judgment" must
have been litigated and decided of necessity in a prior proceeding.' 3
n338 US. 49 (1949).
"356 US. at 471.
""The prior judgment is conclusive only as to facts which have such rela-
tion to the issue that their determination was necessary to the decision of the issue."
Karameros v. Luther, 279 N.Y. 87, 91 (1938). ColIens v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 430
(1923); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 US. 351, 353 (1876); State v. Coblentz, 168
Md. 159, i8o Ad. 266, 268 (1935); Griffen v. Keese, 187 N.Y. 454, 464 (1907); State v.
Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63, 67 (1940).
There is considerable authority for this interpretation. United States v. Hal-
brook, 36 F. Supp. 34 , 349 (E.D. Mo. 1941); People v. Cygan, 229 Mich. 172, 200
N.V. 967, 968 (1924); People v. Rogers, 102 Misc. 437, 17o N.Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 184 App. Div. 461, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451, aff'd, 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 882 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Greevy, 75 Pa. Super. zi6, rev'd, 271 Pa. 95, 114 AtI. 511, 513, cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 659 (1922); State v. Erwin, ioi Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285, 312 (1941);
State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63, 67 (1940).
Cases holding contra to this view are Sealfon v. United States, 332 US. 575,
58o (1948); Coffey v. United States, 116 US. 436, 444 (1885); United States v. De
Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 469 (3 d Cir. 1943); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 1O9, 17 S.E.2d 573,
581 (1941); State v. Meek, 112 Iowa 338, 84 N.W. 3, 6 (19oo); People v. Grezesczak,
77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y. Supp. 538, 541 (Nassau County Ct. 1912).
"The State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and
criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a
denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of
the Federal Constitution." Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899).
"The judicial act of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing
and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State. The general question, therefore, is,
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When the issues presented to the jury are known and the verdict of
that jury is known, the determination of what was necessarily decided
by that verdict must be arrived at as a matter of law, in this case as a
matter of New Jersey law. It was decided as a matter of New Jersey
law that it was impossible to determine with certainty which issues
of fact were decided by the former general verdict of acquittal.
A federal constitutional question was also presented to the United
States Supreme Court, that is, whether the New Jersey law, as de-
termined by the New Jersey court, violates due process guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment.14 Justice Harlan concluded that the
New Jersey Supreme Court had not exceeded constitutionally permis-
sible bounds in determining "that the jury might have acquitted pe-
titioner at the earlier trial because it did not believe that the victims
of the robbery had been put in fear, or that property had been
taken from them, or for other reasons unrelated to the issue of 'iden-
tity'."' 5 This conclusion, though, should have been based on ac-
ceptance of a constitutionally valid New Jersey rule of law rather
than on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation of facts.
A wholly different conclusion is reached by Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren as to the claim that defendant had been denied due process of law
by requiring him to litigate a second time the issue of alibi. The
Chief Justice states: "In my view the issue posed here is not a 'fact
issue' at all. The facts are clear and undisputed. The problem is to
judge their legal significance."' The Chief Justice's conclusion that
the New Jersey rule is unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment seems necessarily to be based on the premise that a large part
of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment. He says:
"Few would dispute that after the first jury had acquitted
petitioner of robbing the first three victims, New Jersey could
not have retried petitioner on the identical charge of robbing
whether such a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment ... by depriving persons of
their life, liberty or property without due process of law." Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (19o8). See note 14 infra.
""Whether the state court erred in its construction of the state constitution and
statutes and the common law on the subject ... is not a Federal question. We are
bound by the construction which the state court gives to its own constitution and
statutes and to the law which may obtain in the State .... The only question, there-
fore, is, as we have stated, whether... [that construction] under the circumstances
amounted to a violation by the State of the Fourteenth Amendment...." West v.
Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 261-62 (i9o3).
"356 U.S. at 472.
"Id. at 475.
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these same three persons. After a jury of 12 had heard the
conflicting testimony of the Jive victims on the issue of the
robber's identity and concluded that at least a reasonable doubt
existed as ,to whether petitioner was one of the robbers, the
same evidence could not be presented to 12 new jurors in the
hope that they would come to a different conclusion.
***The vice of this procedure lies in relitigating the same
issue on the same evidence before two different juries with a
man's innocence or guilt at stake."
17
With double jeopardy brought under -the fourteenth amendment, the
reach is not so far to encompass aspects of collateral estoppel as well.
The Chief Justice's view then is that since the only contested issue
in the Hoag case was based on alibi; an acquittal in the case as a
matter of constitutional law, must havebeen based on a failure of
the state to prove the defendant was present at the scene of the
crime. This issue cannot under the double jeopardy clause, incorported
into the fourteenth amendment, be litigated in any other criminal
proceeding.
It is doubtful whether former jeopardy is such a fundamental
concept as to be "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"'1
and thus within the purview of fourteenth amendment due process.19
Even if former jeopardy were such a fundamental concept, the
basis for such a holding clearly could not be applied to hold col-
lateral estoppel such a fundamental concept. While former jeopardy
has its roots deep in our common law system, collateral estoppel has
for its basis mere policy considerations. 20 When such matters as the
right to trial by jury,21 immunity from prosecution except as the re-
sult of an indictment, 22 and immunity from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion 23 have been determined not to be such fundamental principles
"Ibid. Justice Douglas, writing a separate dissent in the principal case, contends
that the defendant should not be triable a second time. He states: "Since the
.petitioner was placed in jeopardy once and found not to have been present or a
participant; he should be protected from further prosecution for a crime growing out
of'the identical facts ind occurring at the same time." Id. at 479.
ssPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
nBrock v. North Carolina, 344 U-S. 424 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U.S.
319 (1937)-
See Polasky, supra note 9, at 219. "'The right to assert the claim of former
jeopardy is guaranteed by the constitution [New York].... Res Judicata, however,
does not rest upon any constitutional provision. It is a 'rule of evidence ...' "
N.Y.L.J. Dec. 18, i9, and 20, 1939, quoted in United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479,
482 (E.D.N.Y. 194o).
=Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (196o).
3Hurtado v. California, iio U.S. 516 (1884).
-Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U-S. 78 (1908).
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